NETWORKS OF FAVOUR: INFORMAL EXCHANGE AND THE NORMALISATION OF CORRUPTIONIN NIGERIA

Abstract

The paper discusses corruption in Nigeria as a social phenomenon, rather than as a set of individual moral or legal violations. It argues that corruption constitutes an informal institutional order shaped by patronage, clientelism, prebendalism, rent-seeking, and nepotism. The theoretical base of this study is anchored in structural functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interactionism and network theory. The study utilises a qualitative, theory-driven, document-based approach to examine the historical trajectory of patronage from precolonial reciprocity systems, to colonial indirect rule and finally to the postcolonial, oil-dependent state. The study demonstrated that corruption has latent stabilising functions in weak institutions, which include helping to form elite consensus, to re-distribute resources and to keep political order. Simultaneously, it entrenches inequality, erodes bureaucratic professionalism, distorts moral values, and undermines democratic accountability. The review also reveals that the cultural norms of loyalty, reciprocity and communal obligation in Nigeria are culture-bound and sanction corruption, where the boundaries between civic duty and self-interest are not distinct. The invisible architecture of governance is a network of patronage among political elites, bureaucrats, contractors, and local intermediaries, and corruption thrives in this environment even after regime change, despite numerous legal reforms. The review concluded that the anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria have failed to achieve the desired results because of their limited scope and the use of a punitive and legalistic approach. It argues that sustainable reform requires a sociological reorientation, which would need to be directed at the social relations, cultural norms and network structures that produce corruption.