

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALFRED SCHUTZ (1899-1959) TO THE EVOLUTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

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Abstract

Alfred Schutz is known for developing and expanding on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, particularly in the realm of the social sciences. While Husserl focused on the structures of consciousness and how objects are perceived, Schutz applied phenomenology to the understanding of the social world, emphasizing how people make sense of their everyday experience. This paper highlighted the contributions of Alfred Schutz to the evolution of phenomenology. Alfred Schutz brought the term, phenomenology into the field of sociology and applied it to address and provide solutions to the problems of society. The key concepts in Alfred Schutz's phenomenology include life-world, intersubjectivity, stock of knowledge and typifications. Phenomenology in sociology developed around symbolic interactionism and the idea that society is made by people rather than the other way round. The methodology used for this paper is content analysis and the sources of data are secondary. This paper notes that Alfred Schutz's work emphasizes that the subjective experience of social reality will continue to be influential in the field of sociology.

Keywords: Alfred Schutz; Evolution; Phenomenology; Interactionism; Life-world.

Introduction

Phenomenology is one of the most frequently discussed and debated theories in contemporary sociological theory. Phenomenology is among the micro sociological analysis rooted in the European philosophical tradition. The theory emphasizes that close observation of human experience and especially the ways that the basic categories of understanding are formed constitute the basic concern. The word phenomenon is derived from a Greek word meaning "appearance". It looks at what the world is like, how it can be known and describes the control of mental entities in relation to the world. In philosophy, the term phenomenon is used to describe things as they appear. Phenomenology is a philosophical sociology that begins with the individual's conscious experiences as the focus of study and attempts to avoid prior assumptions, prejudices, and other dogmatic forms of thinking while investigating social behaviors (Wallace and Wolf, 2006).

Phenomenologists take the symbolic interactionists' concern one step further, that is, the subjective word of the actor is a reality in itself. Therefore, theory should not be about what is "outside" consciousness, but it should be about how, and in what ways, the subjective states of actors are created, maintained, or changed. The focus, phenomenologists further argue, should be on common sense, conscious experience, and routine daily life, while seeking to understand the world from the point of view of the acting subject and not from the perspective of the scientific observer.

It studies the structure of various type of experience from the perception, thoughts, including linguistic activity. It also studies many types of experiences from thought, memory, imagination, emotion, to desire etc. It is an approach within the field of sociology that aims to reveal what role human awareness plays in the production of social action, social situation and social situations and the social world. Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first person's point of view (Smith, 2008). Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience (Sokolowski, 2000).

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement founded by Edmund Husserl, which focuses on the structures of experience and consciousness. Husserl's work laid the foundation for phenomenology as a distinct philosophical movement and his ideas influenced many other thinkers, including Martin Heidegger, Jean - Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau - Ponty and Alfred Schutz. Alfred Schutz's work laid the ground work for the later development in social phenomenology and influenced various fields such as sociology, anthropology and psychology.

The contribution of Schutz to the development of phenomenology helped to bridge the gap between philosophical phenomenology and the empirical study of social life.

Phenomenology is the study of phenomena. It studies the structures of various types of experience from perception and thoughts, including linguistic activity. It also studies many types of experience from thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire etc. Phenomenology is an approach within the field of sociology that aims to reveal what role human awareness plays in the production of social action, social situation and social situations and social worlds. In essence, phenomenology is the belief that society is a human construction.

Phenomenology also is a way of thinking about ourselves. Instead of asking about what we really are, it focuses on phenomena. These are the experiences that we get from the senses: what we see, taste, smell, touch, hear and feel. Phenomenology is the philosophical study of objectivity and reality (more generally) as subjectively lived and experienced. It seeks to investigate the universal features of consciousness while avoiding assumptions about the external world, aiming to describe phenomena as they appear to the subject, and to explore the meaning and significance of the lived experience. Schutz explained that phenomenology examines how members of society describe their everyday world, especially how individuals with their consciousness construct meaning from interactions with other individual.

The paper explains the contributions of Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) to the evolution of phenomenology.

Methodology

This study used qualitative approach which enabled the authors to get in-depth information from secondary data sources such as text books, journals, magazines, etc.

Biography and Academic background of Alfred Schutz

Alfred Schutz was born on April 13th, 1899, in Vienna, Austria. After graduating from high school, he served as a lieutenant in the Austrian army during the World War I, fighting on the Italian front. After the war, Schutz enrolled at the University of Vienna, where he earned a doctorate in law in 1921. He also studied at the Viennese Academic of International Trade from 1919 to 1920, specializing in international law. During his time at the University of Vienna, Schultz attended lectures by Max Weber, which led him to conclude that Weber, which led him to conclude that Weber had left the problem of meaning unexplicated. Schutz was also influenced by the works of Ludwig Von Mises, Henri Bergson, William James, and Edmund Husserl. Despite his formal education in law, Schultz was deeply interested in philosophy and social

theory. He engaged with various intellectual circles in Vienna, including the Austrian School of Economics, where he was influenced by Von Mises and other prominent economists and philosophers.

In 1932, Schutz published his seminal work, “The phenomenology of the social world”, which established him as a significant figure in the field of sociology. This work drew heavily on the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and the sociological theories of Weber, aiming to create a philosophical foundation for the social sciences. Schutz’s work bridged sociological and phenomenological traditions, relating Husserl’s work to the social sciences. He used Husserl’s phenomenology to develop the philosophical foundations of Max Weber’s sociology particularly in the area of meaning and subjective experience in social action. In the same year, he migrated to the United States due to the rise of Nazism in Europe. He settled in New York City and took up a position at the new school for social research, where he taught sociology and philosophy until his death in 1959. Schutz’s work laid the foundation for future development in sociological theory and methodology, particularly in the area of ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and social constructionism. His emphasis on the subjective experience of social reality continues to be influential in the field of sociology.

How Alfred Schutz adopted and extended Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology

By adopting and extending Husserl’s phenomenology, Schutz created a distinct approach that emphasizes social reality, intersubjectivity and everyday experiences, significantly contributing to the development of social phenomenology. Below are instances of how Schutz adopted and extended Husserl’s phenomenology in several ways as proposed by Unah (1996).

- i. **Social phenomenology:** Schutz applied phenomenology to social sciences, exploring social reality, intersubjectivity and everyday experiences.
- ii. **Life - world:** Schutz expanded Husserl’s concept of life - world to include broader social and cultural contexts, emphasizing its practical, everyday aspects.
- iii. **Intersubjectivity:** Schutz emphasized the importance of intersubjectivity, recognizing that our experiences are shaped by social interactions and shared meanings.
- iv. **Typifications:** Schutz introduced the concept of typifications, which refers to the ways we categorize and make sense of others and the world around us.
- v. **Stock of knowledge:** Schutz developed the idea of a “stock of knowledge”, which refers to the shared, taken-for-granted assumptions and beliefs that guide our actions.

- vi. **Finite province of meaning:** Schultz adopted Husserl's concept of "finite provinces of meaning" to explore how we navigate different realms of experience.
- vii. **Phenomenology of the everyday:** Schutz focused on the phenomenology of everyday experiences, exploring how we make sense of the world in mundane situation.
- viii. **Extension of phenomenological method:** Schultz adopted Husserl's phenomenological method to suit social scientific inquiry, incorporating empirical and sociological approaches.
- ix. **Critique of Husserl's work idealism:** Schutz critiqued Husserl's idealism by arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between subjective experience and social reality.
- x. **Integration with other disciplines:** Schutz integrated phenomenology with sociology, anthropology and philosophy, creating a unique interdisciplinary approach.

Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Concept

Some of the concepts which form the foundation of Schutz's phenomenological sociology which explores how individuals construct and negotiate meanings in everyday life include:

(i) **Intersubjectivity:** For Schutz, intersubjectivity is at the genesis of life-world, a fundamental part that gave it structure. As part of the experience assembled upon the life-world and being a shared and not private one, it is the basis on which all social relations are built. Intersubjectivity is the basis of living together with others in specific dimensions of time and space for sharing the understanding of the life – world with them. Through intersubjectivity we refine the stock of knowledge by validating or adjusting it to subsequent experiences where the stock is only partially originated by personal experience. The biggest part comes from living in the life-world intersubjectivity, that is, through the experience with others and the meanings of these experiences are common and shared with others.

In other words, intersubjectivity permits the awareness of the life – world one shares in a given place and time, through the presence of others or what they leave behind, objects, ideas, symbols, representations, images. Hence there is a commonness of place, where others are either present in body or in sedimented actions that leave a trace of past presence. It is also "socially derived, handed down and accepted by me through others as a frame of reference, interpretation and orientation" (Schutz, 1962).

Subsequently it is a learning process, not solely a personal experience. With this in mind, it is easy to incorporate the essential role of language in intersubjectivity as the medium used to divide- share the understanding of the life-world. It is through language that subjectivity is shared

by means of the contained typifications used to comprehend and be in the life-world. With language, the boundaries of space and time are defined as well as acts and thoughts relevant to the life-world. It is of course, the principal instrument used to giving meaning to the life-world. As Duranti (2010), explains, intersubjectivity is a condition for communication, not a product or effect of it, as has been proposed by some constructivist frameworks. It is something that must be achieved through activities as the use of language and other communication resources.

Even though language is the medium where the shared comprehension of the world is “transmitted” (Schutz, 1962) and subjectivity is shared by language and the paramount vehicle of communication, it is a tool of non-conceptual meaning in Schutz’s view. “Intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved in the transcendental sphere but is rather a datum of the life – world” (Schutz, 1966). For him, intersubjectivity or the “we” relationship is “ontologically intrinsic to human beings”. (Schutz, 1966), it is constitutional of human thinking and living. He thus supports an intersubjective social ontology.

Intersubjectivity is by no means equivalent to shared or mutual understanding of the world. It is more basic and foundational. It is pragmatic in the sense that it is grounded in the being of things or their thingness and inherent to the “wide – awokeness” of the everyday person, or the person whose intentional acts are dominated by “eminently practical” interest. It speaks to the potentiality of the person to develop (grow, mature, falsify, validate) the understanding of the “other”, life, and the common typifications within his stock of knowledge. Physical space, time and beings constitute a phenomenological unity. Space, time and beings, in either perspective, are not disconnected variables. They constitute a unified totality.

(ii) **Stock of knowledge:** This refers to the accumulation of knowledge, experience, and meaning that individuals and societies possess. It is the shared understanding and common sense that people use to navigate everyday life. Schutz argued that this stock of knowledge is constantly being revised and updated through social interaction and experiences (Schutz, 1957). Stock of knowledge in Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology consists of:

1. **Background of knowledge:** Schutz argues that our experiences and interactions are influenced by a pre- existing background of knowledge, which is taken for granted and critically examined.
2. **Shared knowledge:** This background of knowledge is shared among members of a social group, creating a common understanding of the world.
3. **Typifications:** Schutz introduces the concept of typifications, which are pre – conceived notions and categories that help individuals to make sense of their experiences.

4. **Sedimentation:** He described how new experiences and knowledge are “sedimented” into the existing stock of knowledge, modifying and updating it over time.
5. **Stratification:** Schutz explains how the stock of knowledge is stratified, with more general and abstract knowledge at one end, and more specific and concrete knowledge at the other.
6. **Relevance:** He emphasizes the importance of relevance in determining which aspects of the stock of knowledge are brought to the forefront in a given situation.
7. **Phenomenological reduction:** Schutz uses the phenomenological reduction to bracket (set aside) assumptions and biases, gaining a more primordial understanding of how the stock of knowledge shapes our experiences.
8. **Typifications process:** This refers to the process of creating and using pre – conceived notions, categories, or types of interpret and make sense of world. Typifications are mental constructs that help individuals organize and simplify their experiences, making it easier to navigate complex social situations. Then, Schutz’s concept of typifications involves
 1. **Categorization:** Grouping people, objects, or events into pre-defined categories.
 2. **Stereotyping:** Attributing characteristics or traits to individuals or groups based on these categories.
 3. **Preconceptions:** Holding pre – existing notions or expectations about people, situations, or events.
 4. **Routine expectations:** Anticipating certain behaviours, outcomes or responses based on past experiences.

Schultz emphasizes that typifications are not fixed or absolute but are constantly revised and updated through social interactions and experiences. By recognizing and critically examining our typifications, we can become more aware of our assumptions and improve our understanding of the world. Also typifications serve as shortcuts for understanding complex situations, frame works for interpreting new experiences, guide for action and decision making. Then however, typifications can also leads to oversimplification, misunderstandings, stereotyping and prejudice and in accurate assumptions.

Alfred Schutz’s concept of the Life World

Schultz’s understanding of some aspects of Husserl’s work, particularly his phenomenological method reductions was obliquely overcome by assuming a more pragmatic approach where he concentrates on the mundane sphere of what he called ‘life-world’. Life world in this context refers to the world of immediate experience common to all of us, not the private

world of any individual. It is the “self – evident”, “pre- scientific”, and “taken – for- granted” world and our “fundamental and paramount reality”. The world of daily life is the world dominated by “eminently practical” interests, the correlate of “wide- awakeness” (Schutz, 1945).

Life - world is the nexus or connection between all people and is all that constitutes our social world. It is ordered without being homogeneous and is not free of contradictions because it is clear only to a limited extent. It is arranged, recognized and validated, and therefore, familiar. The meaning of the everyday connections is depicted from an inventory of what Schutz (1943) called “stock of knowledge at hand”, constituted of learnt biographical and taken for granted typifications. Typifications are “passive associations operating in the natural attitude of the life-world and the awareness of the wide- awake person encountering others (and himself) in everyday life”(Schutz, 1943).

For Schutz, in the life – world we are concerned with pragmatic issues such as temporal and spatial structure that lead us to means and ends relations that lay out a cultural and biographical past toward an individual and inter- subjectively built future (Schutz, 1967). As our direct experience is formed in the life – world, the past sediments in it, the present takes form in it, and the future is molded from it. Therefore, we cannot understand social interaction without the life – world.

For Schutz and for that matter for Husserl, positive sciences substituted the life- world for idealizations, theories, models, laws, and showed how profoundly knowledge had lost contact with experience. Life- world, as he understood it, was constituted by intersubjectivity or a person to person social interaction in our day to day experience as human beings with others connected by actions, influences, ideas etc., in the course of understanding and being understood by others, in mutual attempts in making sense of the life-world and others (Schutz, 1967). Life – world is a cultural life because it is made of meanings, symbols that we constantly interpret and institute through our actions and hence, it is space where life views, habit, values, customs, institutions form and solidify.

Schutz writes about this from a first – person perspective, in the form of “I assume that all that make sense to me makes sense to all those with whom I share the life- world. My actions make sense, and I suppose that others are interpreting them meaningfully as well, and I make sense of what others do too. In these reciprocal acts of giving and positing meaning to yourself and others, intersubjective social life is built. It is also the social life of others” (Schutz, 1967). He considers that all this happens in a mundane sphere and makes sense with all things included in that life- world, natural, living beings and meaningful products such as symbols, tools,

language systems, works or arts etc. From things inherited and learned, from all sediments of tradition, of habit, and the previous constitution of meaning, which can be stored and reactivated or left behind, the store of experience of the life – world is built a closed meaningful complex. This compound is a source selected from what is relevant, depending on the demands of the moments.

Schutz understood that the natural building of the life- world could be questioned scientifically by means of the reductions, the technical procedures of Husserl's phenomenology. His insight was that this procedure could be displaced from the individual in the first person and relocated to a typology, following Max Weber's ideal types. Therefore, it could lead to a "commonness", those aspects that were shared in all individual experiences, that transcended the individual and built an intersubjective social knowledge. The product of this reduction would be a scientific inference from the phenomenological point of view. In other words, the reduction process would lead us to the subjacent and shared structures of the different aspects of the life-world and from these structures to the individual and shared experiences that generate social phenomena, such as institutions, legal and economic systems, etc. In economics for example, there is the ideal type, the homo economicus. It is an ideal type that can be considered the center of life- world of economics and not an empirical subject.

By the same token, in law, the subject of law is an idealized homo with characteristics and interactions that put it in the center of the life- world of the law. The life- world was instrumental to Schutz's comprehension and problem solving of the social world and hence, gave answers to his inquiries. Nevertheless, it needed to be complemented by intersubjectivity in order to fulfil the first concentric circle of his social phenomenology and serve as a pillar to his inquiry into how social interaction organizes the self and the group.

Areas in which Alfred Schutz's concept of the Life-World (*Lebenswelt*) differ from Edmund Husserl's original concept

By building upon Husserl's foundations, Schutz adopted the concept of life - world to better suit his sociological and phenomenological interests, creating a distinct perspective on the nature of everyday experience. The differences are in several ways:

1. **Focus:** Husserl's focused on the individual's subjective experience, whereas Schutz emphasized the social and intersubjective aspects of life – world.
2. **Scope:** Husserl's life – world was primarily concerned with the individual's immediate surroundings whereas Schutz expanded it to include broader social and cultural context.

3. **Methodology:** Husserl employed a more abstract, phenomenological reduction to examine the life – world, whereas Schutz used a more empirical sociological approach.
4. **Emphasis:** Husserl stressed the role of subjective experience and intentionality, whereas Schutz highlighted the role of every mundane experiences and social interaction.
5. **Context:** Husserl developed his concept in the context of transcendental phenomenology, whereas Schutz applied it to social phenomenology and sociology.
6. **Intersubjectivity:** Schutz placed greater emphasis on intersubjectivity, recognizing that our experiences are shaped by social interactions and shared meaning
7. **Practicality:** Schutz focused on the practical, everyday aspects of the life- world, whereas Husserl explored more abstract theoretical dimensions.

Contributions of Alfred Schutz to the development of Phenomenology

Alfred Schultz was interested in and influenced by the work of the German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920). In 1932 Schutz published a work which was termed the phenomenology of the social world, which impacted on the development of phenomenological school. Though, while creating his sociological ideas based on the analysis of Weber work, his considerations were from a critical perspective. In his endeavor to establish the basis for an interpretative sociology, Schultz critically adopted weber's insistence that understanding social action was the methodological and epistemological foundation of sociology. Social action occurs when actors are consciously aware of each other and attribute meanings to their common situation. Therefore, understanding involved the two perspectives, of the actor and the observer (Duranti, 2010). He emphasized on the concept of social being defined in terms of a relationship between behavior of two or more people, and the concept of action being defined as behavior to which subjective meaning is attached. Therefore, social action is oriented towards the past, present or future behavior of another person.

Among sociologists and philosophers, Alfred Schutz is the major representative of a phenomenologically based sociology. Using Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, he established the epistemological foundations of Max Weber's sociology of understanding. He created the basis for a methodology of qualitative social science and most significantly developed a theory of the life- world. In establishing a specific conception of the life-world, Schutz was able to combine a theory of knowledge and relevance with a theory of social action. He also succeeded in developing a theory of the sign and symbol and a unique methodological perspective to serve as a basis for this entire paradigm.

Schutz's life work remained unfinished and incomplete, due to his early death, but at the same time it provides a source of a wide variety of starting-points for further theoretical and empirical investigation in social science. Schutz's theory of the life- world especially offers great potential to explore the social world from the perspective of methodological individualism and proposes a theoretical conception to deal with the interrelationship of individual and social collectivity or society. The Schutzian theory establishes a profound and unique conceptual framework for the sociological analysis of the subjectivity of the individual actor in the social world which is incomparable, and the further impact of this paradigm was definitely characterize essential future developments in social science.

The core influence on Alfred Schutz's work, as mentioned, comes from Max Weber's sociology of understanding which was already the focus of his early work. He struggled to discover the foundations of Weber's postulate that sociology has to concentrate on the subjective meaning the individual actor confers on his or her actions. In the beginning Schultz relied on Henri Bergson's vitalist philosophy. Schutz's effort to provide a foundation for Weber's interpretative sociology has given rise, as is well known, to a proto sociology: a sociology, that is, which analyses the basic eidetic structures of the life-world, the world in which human experience takes shape. Essentially, Schutz adopts the phenomenology of the natural standpoint, which he regards as an adequate epistemological framework for the social sciences. His constructionist outlook which sets aside the ontology of reality and suspends judgement on what reality per se may be. What emerges from the phenomenological epoche is the subject's experience of reality, the meaning of reality: 'it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality.

Influence of Alfred Schutz's work on the development of sociology and social theory

Alfred Schutz's phenomenological approach to social science emphasizes the importance of understanding how individuals construct and negotiate meanings in social interactions, shaping our understanding of social reality. Also, his work influenced notable sociologists and phenomenologists such as: Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Schutz's ideas significantly influenced Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, particularly their seminal work, "The Social Construction of Reality" (1966). Schutz's influence also extended to the development of symbolic interactionism, a sociological framework that focuses on the symbolic meanings that individuals attach to objects, events, and behaviors. Although symbolic interactionism is often associated with George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer, Schutz's emphasis on subjective meanings and social interactions provided a philosophical grounding for this approach. Symbolic

interactionists build on Schutz's ideas to explore how individuals create and interpret social symbols through their interactions.

The Phenomenological Tradition

Schutz's work had a lasting impact on the phenomenological tradition in social theory. His application of phenomenology to the social sciences inspired later phenomenologists to explore how subjective experiences shape social realities. Schutz's integration of phenomenological concepts into sociology provided a model for subsequent scholars to investigate the lived experiences of individuals and their implications for social theory. His phenomenological approach continues to influence social constructionist theories and research in sociology. Specifically Alfred Schutz's work significantly influenced the development of sociology and social theory in several ways:

1. **Phenomenological Sociology:** Schutz's integration of phenomenology and sociology creates a new approach, focusing on subjective experience and meanings.
2. **Social Constructionism:** His emphasis on how individuals construct and negotiate meanings in social interactions shapes social constructionist theory.
3. **Symbolic Interactionism:** Schutz's ideas on typifications and intersubjectivity influence symbolic interactionist perspectives.
4. **Ethnomethodology:** His work on everyday life and taken-for granted assumptions inspires ethnomethodological studies.
5. **Phenomenology of the Everyday:** Schutz's focus on mundane experiences and common sense informs research on daily life and routine activities
6. **Social Phenomenology of Knowledge:** His concept of stock of knowledge influences the sociology of knowledge and understanding how knowledge is constructed and shared
7. **Interpretive Sociology:** Schutz's emphasis on understanding subjective meaning and interpretations shapes interpretive approaches in sociology.
8. **Qualitative Research Methods:** His phenomenological approach influences the development of qualitative research methods, such as in-depth interviews and ethnography.

Criticisms of Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Work

Even though Schutz's phenomenological work has been influential, it has also faced criticisms for its abstract nature, lack of empirical engagement, failure to address certain philosophical problems, and perceived individualistic stance. However, supporters argue that his

approach provides valuable insights into the subjective dimensions of social reality often overlooked by other methodologies.

In summary some of the criticisms of Schutz work on phenomenology are;

1. **Abstract nature of his theories:** Schutz's phenomenological approach, with its focus on the structures of consciousness and the life – world, involves highly theoretical and conceptual analysis that can be difficult to apply to empirical research and practical social issues. His emphasis on subjective experience and intentional structures requires a level of abstraction that may seem distant from the everyday concerns of social scientists and practitioners.
2. **Lack of direct engagement with empirical data:** Schutz's theories often lack empirical validation and concrete data to support their claims. Incorporating more empirical research could provide a more robust foundation for his conceptual models and enhance their applicability to real – world social phenomena.
3. **Failure to address the problem of “other minds”:** Much of the rigor of Schutz's analysis of social life is vitiated by his failure to come to grips with the philosophical problem of “other minds”. Analysis and critique of Schutz's “general thesis of the alter ego” reveals the sterility of either pragmatic or dogmatic use of philosophic concepts in social science conceptualization.
4. **Perceived as a representative of social ontological individualism:** Schutz tends to be falsely considered as an illustrious representative of social ontological individualism. However, his social ontology is based on intersubjectivity, not isolated account of transcendental intersubjectivity. Schutz's criticism of the Husserlian account of transcendental intersubjectivity is seen as crucial in the development of his intersubjectivist social individuality.
5. **Lack of engagement with the Husserlian ontology.** His objections call into question the philosophical pertinence of the so called problem of transcendental intersubjectivity itself.

Conclusion

Alfred Schutz's work contributed immensely to the evolution of phenomenology. He contributed to sociology of knowledge and showed how reality as a whole, rather than just social reality, is created and installed as an objective reality, which in turn, affects society's members subjectively through internalization and socialization processes. He created the ground work for social constructivism which is used in a variety of fields in the social sciences. Schutz made significant contributions to phenomenology particularly in its application to social sciences. While Schutz is not the pioneer of phenomenology which was developed by Edmund Husserl,

he extended and applied phenomenological ideas to the analysis of social world and made unique contributions.

Schutz's contributions to the field of phenomenology lies primarily in his application and extension of phenomenological concept to social world. He integrated Husserl's ideas with sociology, providing new insights into intersubjectivity, social action and everyday experience. Alfred Schutz's work significantly influenced the development of phenomenological sociology, providing the foundation for later sociologists such as Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Harold Garfunkel.

The study concludes by way of summary that:

- (a) Alfred Schutz referred to as the founder of phenomenological sociology, contributed enormously to bridging the gap in the works of other scholars.
- (b) Schutz's work which on phenomenology which emphasises the subjective experience of social reality continues to be influential in the field of sociology.
- (c) The application of Alfred Schutz's phenomenology to the social sciences explores social reality intersubjectivity and everyday experience.
- (d) Schutz's phenomenology of the social world impacted the development of the Phenomenological school.
- (e) Schultz critically adopted Weber's insistence that social action was the methodological and epistemological foundation of sociology.
- (f) Schultz's brand of phenomenology integrated with sociology, anthropology and philosophy, created a unique interdisciplinary approach.
- (g) Schultz's integration of phenomenological concepts into sociology provided a model for subsequent scholars to investigate the lived experiences of individuals and their implications for social theory.

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