

# BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: ANALYSIS OF PROCUREMENT IN THE POLICE AND MILITARY SECTORS

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## Abstract

Corruption has been a critical issue in the development strides of Nigeria, worse where administrative personnel, instead of the diligent execution of work under extant codes of public administration, convert such positions to market-centered platforms for personal profit. The Nigerian armed forces have been playing significant roles in crisis management especially, the fight against insurgency in the country. This paper examined bureaucracy and corruption: analysis of procurement in the police and military. The modernization theory was adopted as the theoretical framework of analysis. Documentary method was adopted as the method of data collection and content analysis was employed as the method of data analysis. Findings from this study has revealed that the Nigerian armed forces do not have adequate weapons to prosecute the war against insurgents. Meanwhile, procurement processes for the acquisition of arms and ammunitions for the Nigerian Army and all the security agencies operating in the country has been marred by corruption. There are also reports of corruption within and outside the armed forces that sabotage the efforts of the armed forces. This third force are politically and financially exposed persons who are involved in corruption. Among the findings, is the fact that although bribery can crop up in arms procurement anywhere, the problem can be far worse in countries where military spending and decision-making lacks transparency, accountability, monitoring and oversight institutions are weak. The paper recommends adequate funding and monitoring of these funds of the armed forces to enable them purchase modern military equipment to fight the insurgents. Therefore, a new approach to arms procurement that seeks to eliminate corruption and some of the controversies surrounding the exercise should be adopted.

**Keywords:** Bureaucracy; Corruption; Procurement; Military; Nigerian Army

## **Introduction**

Bureaucracy is an integral feature of modern societies established to handle business of government, including formulation and implementation of policies. However, many African bureaucrats convert their expanding roles to their benefits through different corrupt activities. Essentially, bureaucracy is a function of the environment in which it operates. It goes on to reason that Nigeria's public bureaucracy is inefficient and corrupt because it is influenced by its environment (Arowolo, 2010).

The foregoing is particularly so due to the laws within the country which are overwhelmed with and characterized by lack of strict adherence to rules, ethics and standard norms that dictate the tone and tenor of moral conduct in public offices (Arowolo, 2010). The overbearing power of public bureaucracy makes it the guide and direction of totality of government's business and activities. To help the state achieve this, it has become imperative to have a seeming standing power evolving from, but placing itself above, the society. Such power that alienates itself more and more from the society is being exercised on behalf of the state by certain institutions, structures and agencies, the bureaucracy being the most important (Arowolo, 2004). Corruption has remained a major problem to economic growth and national development in Nigeria. Government procurement involves a high risk of corruption because of the great size of financial turnover and the complexity of many procurement processes in which businesses interact very closely with politicians and civil servants (Eme & Umeokafor, 2019).

In Nigeria, corruption has been identified as the bane of urgently needed development in the country. Corruption remains the greatest threat to the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and even to the continued existence of the Nigerian state (Owete, 2014). Corruption inhibits socio-economic development and denies equitable distribution of wealth and makes sure some sections of the country, which are considered 'ethnically disadvantaged' to remain worst off in the distributive arrangement of national resources (Obi, 2017). Corruption has been identified as the major clog in the development wheel of the country. It has allowed fraudulent accumulations that have resulted in the progressive and phenomenal enrichment of Nigerian rulers thereby impoverishing the greatest number of Nigerians, making them hopeless; the future of the youth has become uncertain and diverting the interest and destiny of the Nigerian youth to armed robbery, drug peddling and trafficking and all manner of racketeering found among the youth of today (Arowolo, 2004). Corruption exacerbates deprivation and accelerates the

scourge of unfulfilled development initiatives culminating in poverty, diseases, ignorance and illiteracy amongst the citizenry of a country as it concentrates wealth of a nation in a few hands (Eme, 2015).

Corruption is a form of dishonest or criminal offence undertaken by a person or organization entrusted with a position of authority to acquire illicit benefit or abuse power for one's private gain. In relation to public procurement, corruption is the appropriation of public goods for private use, in violation of extant rules (Soreide, 2002). Such corruption could mean "offering, giving, or promising to give, directly or indirectly, to any officer or employee of any Procuring Entity or other governmental/private authority or any individual a gratuity in any form, an employment or any other thing or service of value, as an inducement with respect to an act or decision of, or method following by, a procuring entity in connection with the procurement proceeding" (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008, p.3). Corruption in this regards is construed as encompassing transactions where persons constrained by a formal principal-agent relationship take advantage of the discretionary power incumbent on them to knowingly confer undue advantage to either themselves or to any third party. It implies the 'partiality and/or abuse of power and/or discretion for profit in the exercise of public procurement-related discretion' (So & Opawole, 2010, p.5).

The problem of corruption is a major challenge with global ramifications that manifests itself throughout the development process (Transparency International, 2010). The widespread level and consequences of corruption in Nigeria has its root in the public procurement process (Makinde, 2003). Similarly, Glenn et al. (2007) posited that given the amount of money involved, public procurement is characterized by extreme competition between bidding companies – a situation that leads them resort to corruption to win the contract. A number of risk factors have been identified as capable of leading it to corruption in public procurement and it ranges from government involvement in the open market; weak institutional capacity and absence of competition; overregulation of private activity; expanded public procurement and poor remuneration of civil servants; to compromise of confidential information (Agbodike et al., 2015). Corruption in procurement undermines the confidence and public trust in the constitution of the police and of the Armed Forces and it is wasteful because too much is spent on a lot of things which do not meet the needs of the police and military in fighting insurgency (Dixon & Raymond, 2017).

In the light of the above, this study seeks to unravel corruption in the Nigerian bureaucracy with particular reference to procurement in the police and military sectors in Nigeria.

## **Literature Review**

### **Bureaucracy and Public Procurement**

The word “bureaucracy” stems from the word “bureau”, used from the early 18th century in Western Europe, not just to refer to a writing desk, but to an office, i.e., a workplace, where officials worked (Kuhn & Sherman, 2014). The original French meaning of the word bureau was the baize used to cover desks. The term bureaucracy came into use shortly before the French Revolution of 1789, and from there rapidly spread to other countries. The Greek suffix – kratia or kratos – means “power” or “rule” (Arowolo, 2004). Bureaucracy is the structure and set of regulations in place to control activity, usually in large organizations and government. It is represented by standardized procedure (rule-following) that dictates the execution of most or all processes within the body, formal division of powers, hierarchy, and relationships. The term procurement is often used in the field of contract administration. Procurement refers to the acquisition of goods and services by an individual or organization, public/private organizations (Fleming, 2003). Transparency International (TI) defines public procurement as the ‘acquisition by a government department or any government owned institution of goods and services (Kuhn & Sherman, 2014, p.1).

Public procurement has been described as being particularly susceptible to corruption involving abuse of power for personal profit due to the high amounts of money involved (Glenn et al., 2007; Keeley, 1995; Søreide, 2002). For Puddephat and Zausmer (2011), public procurement refers to the acquisition of goods, equipment, supplies and or services on behalf of a government entity. Without mincing words, the procurement of goods or services by government or its agencies is one of the key operations through which the government fulfills its promises of taking development projects to the next level in governance. Public procurement therefore means the acquisition by any means of goods, works or services by the government. In Nigeria, procurement is defined as the act of acquiring goods and services, and public procurement is the acquisition of goods, services or works through any means, by a public authority or entity (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b). As a statutory requirement: ‘a public procuring entity shall plan its procurement

(a) preparing the needs assessment and evaluation; (b) identifying the goods, works or services required; (c) conducting appropriate market and statistical fieldwork and on that basis prepare analysis of the cost implications of the proposed procurement' (Igwe et al., 2021).

While public procurement in Nigeria aims at ensuring only qualified contractors are selected to execute a contract, corruption continues to happen (Arrowsmith & Trybus, 2003; Caldwell et al., 2005; Dike, 2005; Nicholls et al., 2011). The administration of public procurement in Nigeria is provided for in the Act of 2007 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007-b). Part I of the Act established the National Council on Public Procurement under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance, with members drawn from the public and private sectors of the Nigerian economy, civil society and a secretary who is also the director general and manager of the public procurement organization charged with the responsibility of overseeing public procurement in Nigeria. The council has responsibility for other policy matters viz. to consider and approve policies on public procurement; approve changes in the procurement process in response to improvements in modern technology and socio-economic challenges; and to give such other directives and perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Public Procurement Act, 2007 (Igwe et al., 2021).

A set of fundamental principles aimed at ensuring that public procurement became a regulated practice in Nigeria in 2007 are set out in part 4 of the Act. The principles enumerate a fundamental set of rules meant to ensure that in addition to being transparent, the practice of public procurement in Nigeria meets the requirements of accountability as it involves the spending of appropriated public money. This means that for every procurement commitment entered into, there is a corresponding fund allocated to meet the financial obligations to be created. Specifically, the Act in section 7(1) states that: '...based only on procurement plans supported by prior budgetary appropriations and no procurement proceedings shall be formalized until the procuring entity has ensured that funds are available to meet the obligations subject to the threshold in the regulations made by the Bureau, and has obtained a Certificate of No Objection to Contract Award from the Bureau<sup>10</sup> by open competitive bidding' (Igwe et al., 2021).

Public procurement law is meant to ensure that the public treasury is not committed to a procurement contract that is not provided for in the budget. As Olatunji (2008) explains, before the public procurement law was implemented in 2007, government departments and

agencies were at liberty to set rules for each contracted item they procured. According to the author, at the time, procuring entities could covertly implement procurement guidelines that would lead to a predetermined contractor being awarded the contract. Furthermore, until they were restrained by the Procurement Act 2007, government appointees were in the habit of committing government to contractual obligations for which monies were not allocated (So & Opawole, 2010). In the pre-2007 era of public contract administration in Nigeria, procurement officers were often confronted by certain contractors who would stop at nothing to coerce them through bribery into influencing contract awards in their favour (Nell, 2009). In contrast with the old order, where the giver of a bribe committed no crime, under the new dispensation of public contract administration in Nigeria, the giver is as guilty as the recipient of the bribe (National Assembly Nigeria, 2000).

### **Stages in Public Procurement**

The stages in public procurement as identified by Igwe et al., (2021) are listed and discussed as follows:

- **Identification of need:** Here the government takes decision to purchase or sell goods or services or to outsource the management of a unit of its establishments.
- **Identification/definition of contract characteristics:** At this stage, the government determines what it needs to buy or sell or privatize. At this stage, the technical requirements, specific characteristics are highlighted. Equally the contracting methods and agency responsible for defining these characteristics are discussed.
- **The contracting process:** At this stage, a contracting process gets underway. It should take place according to what method the law determines should be used to receive proposals or expression of interests. For instance, open bidding system or evaluation of contractors by the use of single source.
- **The award of contract:** At this stage, the contract process ends with a decision to select the winning bidder (in open bids) or the contractor in case of single-source process.
- **Contract implementation and Supervision:** Finally, the contract is signed with the selected bidder or contractor as the case may be.

### **The Concept of Corruption**

Ontologically, the word corruption comes from the Latin verb “*rumpere*” meaning “to break”, which connotes the breaking of normal or societal norms or practices. The word

“corrupt” when used as an adjective literally means “utterly broken”. It was first used by Aristotle and later Cicero who added the terms bribe and abandonment of good habit (Igwe et al. 2021). Corruption refers to an act which results in any right, interest, title or privilege being illegitimately conferred on any person. Corruption has been perceived in different ways as the abuse of public power for private use and benefit (Tanzi, 1998), the exercise of lawful authority to influence the allocation of rights and privileges in favour of predetermined individuals at the expense of others (Asada, 2010; Colombatto, 2003). From the perspective of Van Roy (1970), it is the use of power, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to obtain profit, prestige or confer benefit on a person, class or group of people contrary to the applicable laws or standards of moral conduct expected of people in leadership positions. Larwal and victor (2015) described corruption as the biggest problem Nigeria has, and a bane to good governance, which has invariably translated into corrosive and geopolitical poverty among the citizenry.

Corruption is a form of dishonest and unethical conduct by a person entrusted with a position of authority, often to acquire personal benefit. Khan sees corruption as an act which deviates from the rules of conduct governing the action of someone in a position of public authority because of private regarding motives such as wealth, power and status. Corruption could also be conceived as pervasion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or depravity (Obi, 2017). Corruption is the abuse of public for private gain, dishonesty for personal gain, dishonest exploitation of power for personal gain, depravity, and extreme immorality. It connotes the abuse of public roles or resources or the use of illegitimate forms of political power and influence, by public or private parties (Gardiner, 2002). Corruption involves violations of oaths of office which commit the officer to upholding the specific non-discriminatory norms governing access to the political process and the allocation of rights, privileges and resources within a given socio-political and economic system (Miller *et al.*, 2005).

Corruption in Nigeria is often believed to arise from the clash or conflict between traditional values and the imported norms that accompany modernization and socio-political development. Corruption is not just tied particularly to the act of bribery, but also it is a general term covering the misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gains, which need not be monetary (Barley, 1966). Corruption has broadly been defined as a perversion or a change from good to bad. Specifically, corruption or corrupt behaviour involves the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit. Corruption is efforts

to secure wealth or power through illegal means private gain at public expense; or a misuse of public power for private benefit (Lipset & Lenz, 2000).

Kwame (2000, p.1) has argued that ‘corruption is prevalent in societies where integration is low and socialisation poor such that recognition of the common national interest is not pervasive enough’. Generally, corruption is a form of social behaviour that is particularly characteristic of societies, which are based on production for private accumulation. The prevalence of corruption has had adverse effects on the Nigerian economy and her quest for economic development. The recent interest in the political dimension of economic growth has had a significant impact on the study of the behaviour of bureaucrats and the ruling elite and how their activities military and police towards public procurement. In the past four decades, Nigeria has been so plagued with the problem of governance that it has been recording a downward trend in economic mismanagement arising from bad governance and corrupt practices that have driven many of the people below the poverty line.

### **Types of Corruption in Public Procurement**

Corruption in public procurement takes place in government or by government officials and their accomplices in the private sector. Another name for public corruption is official, grand or institutional corruption. Corruption in public procurement can be grouped into petty or bureaucratic, grand or political, and systemic or endemic corruption (Doig *et al.* 2005). Other forms of corruption include: bribery, fraud, embezzlement, extortion, favouritism, nepotism, etc.

**Petty or bureaucratic corruption:** Corruption here is still at the level of government. It involves the technocrats and civil as well as public servants who implement government policies. This type of corruption alters the implementation of policies, as where civil servants circumvent the strict implementation of extant rules – for this study, procurement rules – in exchange for illicit petty financial rewards (Kayrak, 2008). These include the leadership and personnel in ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). The corruption at this level is the worst as the allocation, release and use of money is executed by these government offices. This kind of corruption has been branded low level and street level. It is the kind of corruption the citizens encounter daily at places like the hospitals, schools, police stations, military, immigration offices and other public offices. Bureaucratic corruption also manifests in favouritism and nepotism in appointment, promotion and

reward systems in public offices. Some persons get rapid promotion and rewards on the basis of family, friendship, ethnic or religious affiliations to the boss; while some never get promotion because of such frivolous considerations (Ade Abulu & Akubo, 2022).

**Grand or political corruption:** This is the kind of corruption that obtains in the three arms of government in a democratic rule, namely, executive, legislative and judiciary. Corruption at this level is the highest because it involves state fund. It involves influencing the formulation of laws, regulation and policies by politicians and other high-profile officers such as permanent secretaries and directors, through such means as revoking licenses and permits or privatizing public enterprises so as to favour their own interests in gaining economic monopoly for illicit substantial financial rewards (Heston & Kumar, 2008). This takes place at the highest levels of political authority. It occurs when the politicians and political decision-makers, who are entitled to formulate, establish and implement the laws, are themselves corrupt. It also takes place when policy formulation and legislation is tailored to benefit political leadership. It can also include purchase of votes with money, promises of office or special favours, coercion, intimidation, and interference with freedom of election (Napal, 2006). The issues of personal and primordial attachments in appointment, award of contracts; as well inflation of contract monies, embezzlement of funds, and misappropriation of fund are critical examples of public corruption in the executive.

**Systemic or endemic corruption:** this essentially involves the combination of petty and grand corruption and thereby characteristic of the corruption in the public procurement process in Nigeria, is said to exist when corruption is an integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political system (Stefes, 2007). In such situation, the major institutions and processes, such as the procurement process of the state, are routinely dominated and used by corrupt civil servants and politicians to create a scenario in which most people have no alternative but to deal with corrupt officials

### **Corruption and Public Procurement in Nigeria**

Corruption in public procurement exists where public officers, in exercising public power or authority, reduce the cost of procurement of public services for some customers or contractors or inflate the cost at which services are procured by the state, albeit for compensation (Heidenheimer, 2002). The problem of corruption is not only endemic in public procurement in Nigeria, but that it is mainly perpetrated by the procurement officers

and their private sector collaborators who benefit from contracts granted through the procurement process. Corruption has long been associated with Nigeria, which is the most populous country in Africa with a population of over 200 million people, 250 languages and over 100 ethnic tribes with abundant natural resources such as oil and gas (Transparency International, 2010). The problem of corruption is reputed to have caused misappropriation in the Nigerian national economy to the point of political, social and economic standstill in the 1980s and 1990s, when the dictatorial regimes of the military cadres ruled Nigeria (De Graaf, 2007).

Development projects contracts awarded by the executives are over-priced and they underperformed. Nobody complains because palms have been greased (Ewurum *et al.*, 2009). Surprisingly, many can acknowledge the fact that corruption is the reason why public procurement and development projects are poorly managed in the world's most populous black nation. Many of the reported corruption cases in Nigeria are said to have been perpetrated through the public procurement process (Okogbule, 2006). In three of such cases involving the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), the Rural Electrification Organization (REO) of Nigeria and the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) of Nigeria, about \$1 billion in public funds was misappropriated through the public procurement process (Awolusi, 2010). Over the years, corruption has generated a large spectrum of negative effects in society and most of the corruption cases reported have been perpetrated through the public procurement process (Bakre, 2010).

Ufere (2010) stated that corruption in the Nigerian public procurement process has two sides to it. The demand-side, which is represented by the government officials that have procurement responsibilities, and the supply-side represented by the private sector contractors who would offer money, gifts or other inducements in order to influence the decisions of the procurement officer. Furthermore, the demand-side of corruption in the public procurement process is exemplified in two stages: firstly, petty, low-level corruption where junior officers demand money from contractors before doing their various duties such as giving out of information pertaining to a particular procurement activity, and secondly, at the strategic level where senior government officials demand bribes in order to influence the award of contract administered through the public procurement process to the contractor or even out-rightly causing appropriated public funds to the contractor, in which case they would share according to an agreed percentage (Adewunmi, 2011; Ufere, 2010).

In Nigeria, corruption has been linked to public office holders who misappropriate public funds for private use through the public procurement process (PPP) (Ajayi and Abdulkareem, 2010). The return of Nigeria to democratic governance in 1999 raised national consciousness about the problem of public procurement-related corruption (Fagbadebo, 2007). As a result, two executive commissions, namely the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) were formed by acts of the Nigerian National Assembly and given a clear mandate to fight corruption in the country in all its ramifications (National Assembly Nigeria, 2000; 2004).

### **Determinants of Corruption in Public Procurement**

**Weak institutions:** Corruption manifest due to weak institutional capacity in the public procurement process to engage in elaborate schemes of bribery for contracts in a way that gave them a spiraling competitive advantage over other companies that bid against them for the contracts (George & Lacey, 2006). Political commitment and strong institutional capacity are central to the success of anti-corruption reforms. Where institutional capacity is weak, corruption can be perpetrated by circumventing the stated process of allocating public goods and services in favour of a select few, at the expense of the interest of the greater majority of the people (Hellman *et al.*, 2000). The effect of weak regulatory institutions has always been that the bigger companies, in particular, are able to engage in wholesale bribery of the bureaucracy, as was the case in the Siemens and Halliburton bribe-for-contract cases (Lewis, 2010).

**Government and the open market:** In many developing countries, corruption in the form of bribery for public contract assignment thrives because the practice is so entrenched and endemic that it seems to be the normal thing to do in order to get a contract from the public sector (Besley & Burgess, 2002; Igwe et al., 2021). Certain forms of government involvement in transactions in open or private sector markets are regarded as capable of generating corruption considering that many companies are prepared to resort to paying bribes to officials charged with the responsibility of administering the public contract process. Furthermore, this creates a situation where even though all the companies would be better off not paying bribes, they still pay, because of the assumption that if they do not pay or do not pay enough, others' bribes, or the amount that others are prepared to bribe, will mean they do not get the contract (Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). The net effect of

this is that all companies involved in the bidding, except the one that eventually wins the contract, make a financial loss. The result is a worsening economic environment and social pressure on otherwise non-corrupt companies to succumb to corruption (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2008).

**Excessive control of private activity:** Business environment that is burdened with over-regulation and an unpredictable bureaucracy has the potential to drive business firms into bribery as a coping strategy. When private activities are subjected to lengthy bureaucratic procedures that make it very difficult to obtain the necessary government authorization needed to operate legally, the tendency will be for private businesses to seek to bribe their way through (Collier & Gunning, 1999). In some instance, the processes are not only cumbersome, they are also unclear and it could take genuine private sector organizations an unnecessarily long period of time to obtain permits and licenses which they need in order to engage in business (Collier, 2000; Collier & Gunning, 1999). According to Collier (2000), the main reason for the increase in cases of corruption in many African countries is the rise in opportunities for engaging in corruption. He further argued that over-regulation of private activity by the public authority is one of the main sources of official corruption.

**Violation of procurement rules:** The violation of the rules guiding the administration of the procurement process can be crafted in such a way that the impropriety will be concealed and the bidding process will seem to have been genuinely conducted in accordance with extant rules (Yukins, 2006). The manipulation of set guidelines for public procurement in favour of a specific bidder over other bidders is a major problem of accountability in the public procurement process (Søreide, 2002). For example, information might be given to the preferred company well before it is made officially available to other bidders, who are constrained in the quality of their submission by the short time given to respond with a bid (Ekpenkhio, 2003). Such exercise of discretionary powers to invite tenders from the pool of would-be bidders must be subjected to oversight checks and balances to avoid abuse by those mandated to discharge such powers.

**Inadequate advertisement of procurement opportunities:** This is an issue for both large and medium businesses interested in government contracts. So many at times, the bids are not advertised especially in states that are yet to implement the bureau of procurement acts as enshrined in the constitution even when the federal government has given directives to

states to have their own procurement bureaus. This paves way for bribery, cronyism and collusion in the award of some contracts (Søreide, 2002).

**Expansion in procurement activities:** Public sector corruption has been associated with the relative growth in public sector procurement activities in the past four decades in Africa (Basheka, 2008; Collier, 2000). Corruption in the public procurement process spans the pre- and post-tender stages of public procurement. Corruption at the pre-tender and tender stages in public procurement consists of a deliberate act of compromise of the guidelines and rules governing the tendering process, with the aim of securing a predetermined result. It is therefore important for this research to study the relationship between the pre-tender, tender and post-tender stages in the public procurement process so as to isolate the inherent risk factors that can predispose the process to corrupt exploitation (Iossa & Martimort, 2011).

**Inadequate political will to fight procurement corruption:** Access is the first entry step to participate in winning government contracts. Improving and extending accessibility of procurement bids to small and medium enterprises interested in government contracts to make it competitive with integrity at each stage of the procurement cycle. In Nigeria, this has proved to be extremely challenging due to lack of political will by government to fight corruption in all sectors holistically. There has been instance of unbridled corruption in high profile contract awards but the government has continued to play the ostrich (Søreide, 2002).

**Compromise of confidential information:** Public officials in possession of information which, if made available to private business concerns, could enhance their competitive advantage over other companies, are a potential source of corruption, especially if the information is relevant to procurement activities that have not been made public. The person in whose hands confidential information is vested could also be given discretionary powers regarding how that information is used in relation to processes such as the public procurement process (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2007).

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is hinged on the modernization theory of corruption propounded by Lipset in 1959. The idea of modernization is relatively new. Its basic principles can be derived from 18<sup>th</sup> century age of enlightenment with the idea that people themselves could develop and change their society (Adefulu, 2007). Modernization theory is used to explain the process of modernization within societies. It therefore, refers to a model of a progressive

transition from a traditional to a modern society. This theory also sees the character of a state's political system, the nature and rate of its socio-economic change as the major causes of political corruption. A major assumption of this theory is that as states reach a developed status, their corruption level will subside. Huntington (1968) in Adefulu (2007) argues that the degree of corruption in a developing state is dependent upon the nature of the state's traditional society, and the nature of the state political and economic modernization processes. He offers that "corruption is one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalism (p.7)".

Corruption is most prevalent in states that lack effective political parties, in societies where the interest of the individuals, family, clique, group, or the clan predominate. In a modernizing polity, the weaker and less accepted political parties, the greater the likelihood of corruption (Adefulu, 2007). Furthermore, Adefulu (2007) citing Huntington observed that the process of economic and political development in modernizing societies tends to breed inequality, political instability and corruption which may be defined simply in terms of the use of public power to achieve private goals. This theory considered corruption to be the hallmark of underdevelopment, while modern societies are perceived as basically free from corruption. Cases of corruption in modernized societies are seen as individual failings or misdemeanors in an efficient world governed by laws and anonymity as opposed to an inefficient world governed by personal networks of greed. While societies classified as modern are considered to be morally superior, underdeveloped societies are viewed as backward and corrupt (Adefulu, 2007).

Given the above therefore, corruption in Nigeria is endemic with cultural phenomena with the level of social, economic, and political underdevelopment in the country. Also, the Nigerian society is bedeviled with corrupt practices such that once a person is appointed into any political office; the expectations from his people will be so high in terms of what the office will offer them. Therefore, the people he or she represents are ready to teach him or her how to steal. Hence, corruption in Nigeria knows no bound irrespective of tribes or cultural affiliations and this is as a result of underdevelopment of Nigeria. Although, other theories such as economic development theory, political institution theory, history and cultural theory and public policy theory could have been used to analyze this study, but none of them was sufficient in explaining the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria better than modernization theory.

## **Methodology**

The methodology adopted for this study is the qualitative research design method based on secondary data. This section deals with the system of inquiry to be adopted for this study and the procedural steps to be taken to ensure the accomplishment of this task; and it focuses on sources of data and method of data analyses applied. The research methodology employed for data collection was to facilitate the information gathering process, in order to achieve the stated objective as well as to arrive at an accurate conclusion on the study. The secondary data were from available information gathered from previous documentation relevant to this area of study which include journal publication, textbooks, internet resources and relevant information from published articles. This approach enhances critical and contextual analysis of issues. The technique of content analysis based on a thematic discussion of issues is used to address the issue of how public funds are budgeted, managed and spent by police and military in procurement and how it affects different strata of people, communities and businesses in Nigeria. This has created gaps in the development projects planning, implementation and successful completion.

## **Discussion**

### **Analysis of Corruption in Police & Military Procurement**

Corruption was widespread among the political class before the military coup in January 1966. Although the military gave prominent position to corruption as the reason for staging the coup and the subsequent coups, unfortunately, military regimes tended to be more corrupt than the regimes they seemed to have come to correct. Despotism, which inevitably characterizes military regimes destroyed a culture of accountability. Characteristically, military regimes upon taking power, in fighting against corruption, would remove from office or dismiss some individuals allegedly for corrupt practices; forcibly seize corruptly acquired property; confiscate property through legislation (decree), directed against particular individuals; and ban and disqualify persons from holding public office. Corruption in military procurement is a very serious problem (Auriol 2006; Willett 2009). Dixon and Raymond, (2017), reiterated their position on the problem of corruption in military establishments across the globe, maintaining that corruption in military procurement was not peculiar to Nigeria, but a global challenge which undermines confidence in state institutions.

Corruption in military establishment is dangerous, divisive and wasteful with far reaching consequences on the state, and fuels insurgency. Defense sector corruption has devastating real world consequences when conflict flares. With lower oil prices, corrupt elites have increasingly exploited alternative illicit revenue streams. Dixon and Raymond, (2017) rightly observed that corruption has been particularly destructive in the defense and security sector. Military spending is a measure of all spending on state defense, which includes maintenance, personnel, domestic production of military equipment, and the purchase of major weapons from foreign entities. The measure for “arms transfers” is but one component of military spending, and arguably the only component that involves purchases in the international market (Drezner & Hite-Rubin 2014).

Military procurement is highly prone to corruption for several reasons. First, for security reasons, governments tend to be least transparent in their spending on defense. This alone creates opportunities for rent seeking and project misallocation. Furthermore, military equipment is usually highly specialized, which reduces market entry and competition among suppliers as well as buyers. Finally, because major arms are expensive and complicated, prices vary highly and thus provide a window for corruption. The highly specialized nature of military goods, large profit margins and lack of market competition sets the stage for bribe-taking, collusion and misallocation. Indeed, research using firm level data indicates that purchases of military equipment are more prone to corruption, and that bribes usurp nearly twice the contract value of any other sector (Cole & Tran, 2011).

According to a Transparency International report, a network of Nigerian military chiefs, politicians, and contractors worked together to steal more than N3.1 trillion through arms procurement contracts between 2008 and 2017. Here are some of the top defense and security procurement related scandals in recent memory as documented by Premium Times (2017), TI (2017) and Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption (2019):

**Table 1: Corruption in defense and security procurement**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Procurement</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Corruption</b>
1.	Progress Limited “gift”	April 29, 2005 to October 19, 2010	The ministry of defense gifted two purchase contracts to Progress Limited for the supply of 42 units of BTR-3U Armored Personnel Carriers and spare parts for the Nigerian Army without documented contract or agreements. There was no cost negotiation between the two parties. Two years later, 26 used APCs were delivered but they broke down almost immediately after they were deployed for peacekeeping operations in Sudan.
2.	The Shaldag contracts	2010	The Shaldag contract is one of the deals that paved the way for a regime of kleptocracy in the Nigerian Defence sector, and the emergence of a gang that has grown to be more powerful than elected regimes. The 2010 deal saw an Israeli shipbuilder, Israeli Shipyards, win a \$25 million contract to supply Nigerian Navy with two fast assault boats. Their market value at the time was estimated to be \$5 million each. Nigeria, therefore, lost \$15 million in the deal. It is unclear how the \$15 million excess was shared between everyone involved, but the Israeli police have established that the middleman, Amit Sade, received \$1.47 million in what is now termed brokerage fee. Three people are facing trial in Israel over this deal.
3.	Dasuki Armsgate	March 2012 to March 2015	At the center of the web of corruption is Col. (retd.) Sambo Dasuki, Jonathan’s National Security Advisor (NSA) effectively controlled military procurement during his period in office with no supervision and virtually no input from the Ministry of Defence. The transactions involved in the Armsgate scandal took place under the rule of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) government of Presidents Umaru Yar’Adua, who ruled from 2007 until his death in 2010, and Goodluck Jonathan, Yar’ Adua’s vice

president, who took over in 2007 and subsequently won reelection in 2011. The scandal, which is still unfolding, involves the alleged theft of at least USD 2.1 billion, and possibly as much as USD 15 billion of extra-budgetary funds between 2007 and 2015 intended for weaponry to aid the government's efforts to defeat the insurgent group, Boko Haram. The deals allegedly benefited a number of senior military officers, politicians, government officials, and businessmen, and their families.

4. N2 billion grew wings from the office of the National Security Adviser May 13, 2013

The Nigerian government released N1.35 billion to re-stock ammunition for OPERATION BOYONA, aimed at dislodging terrorist camps along the borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Two months later, the National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki, requested and got approval for additional N2 billion. It does appear neither the Defence Headquarters nor the soldiers on the battlefield benefited from the second cash released to the NSA. The money is believed to have disappeared, an allegation Mr. Dasuki is denying.

5. Cash for Black market Arms in South Africa September 5, 2014

The South African border authorities seized \$9.3 million belonging to Nigeria from two Nigerians and an Israeli who arrived the country in a private jet owned by a pastor, Ayo Oritsejafor. Customs officers discovered the money stashed in three suitcases after the suitcases were put through airport scanners. The Nigerian government later admitted the money was meant for the procurement of black market arms for the Nigerian military.

6. Cash in bullion vans For Special Services Late 2014 to early 2015

Cash withdrawal from CBN using two bullion vans Former President Goodluck Jonathan authorised the withdrawal of N67.2 billion in cash from the Central Bank of Nigeria between November 2014 and February 2015 for "special services," linked

- to defence and security operations. How the funds were used remains unclear.
7. URGENT” N7 billion Boko Haram funds missing January 2015  
Nurudeen Mohammed, the then Minister of State Foreign Affairs, requested N7 billion to urgently fund operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin. The funds were released to the National Security Adviser. It is unclear how the money was used. Officials say most were traced to companies that had no business with the Task Force. One and a half billion naira was withdrawn in cash.
  8. Defense cash stashed in defense chief’s wife’s apartment (Ikoyi Scandal) April 12, 2017  
Whistleblowers led the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to a house in upscale Ikoyi where \$43.4 million was kept. The NIA director later claimed the money was meant for undisclosed special security and defence projects. Investigations are still going on and the real motive for keeping the fund in that location remained unclear.
  9. Santa Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) May, 2017  
The 2012 sale of seven decommissioned Norwegian naval vessels took a curious turn when a report revealed that they were serving, two years later, in the private flotilla of a former Nigerian dissenter. In 2016, after a change in government in Nigeria, the GWVSL fleet was seized and its controllers charged with conspiring with NIMASA officials to embezzle funds. The Value of deal: is USD 12 million and the sum involved in corruption allegations is USD 242,000. The news about the six demilitarized missile torpedo boats and one naval support vessel, the former KNM Horten, triggered an investigation that led to the conviction in May 2017 of one Norwegian official on bribery charges and the revelation of the role played by a UK intermediary, CAS-Global Ltd. The firm applied for export licenses in Norway and for a re-export license for the Horten from the UK, telling the Norwegians

that the ships would support an ECOWAS mission and the British that they were intended for use by the Nigerian government. In fact, the vessels would be passed on to Global West Vessel Specialist Ltd. (GWVSL), a private firm likely controlled by the former Nigerian rebel Government Ekpemupolo, which had obtained a maritime law enforcement contract from the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA).

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**Source: Harnessed by the author from diverse Nigerian print media sources**

Corruption in public procurement affects the efficiency of public spending and donors' resources, creates wastes and ultimately affects the quality of development projects constructed and managed in developing democracy. The present federal government should always disclose public information on major contracts to credible civil society organizations, media and the general public. The reports of the joint national assembly on oversight of certain agencies or institutions should be made available to enhance public scrutiny. Corruption in the public service sector implies that public servants have jettisoned their commitment to national consensus and development for their selfish ends, hence the cumulative impact of turning individual public service positions into market centers for profit maximizations undermines commitment to the ends of the public and stifles national development by extension (Willett, 2009). The implications of bad leadership and corruption in Nigeria are outrageous. In the opinion of Aiyede (2006) "corruption poses a serious development challenge".

Ijewereme and Dunamade (2014) observed that the Nigerian political realm shows that corruption has undermined democratic values of trust, credibility of government, and good governance. Corruption in the democratic process reduces accountability, transparency, integrity and distorts quality representation in policy making (Ebegbulem, 2012). Corruption in Nigeria slows down the pace of good governance because it weakens efficiency and effectiveness of public service and discourages genuine prospective investors. The critical challenge which the persistence and growing virus of corruption poses to all Nigerians of integrity and conscience is, therefore, how to roll back the phenomenon of corruption in our public life and arrest the culture of impunity that underpins it. Meeting this challenge will involve the mounting of a determined and robust struggle to change the constitutional and legal order and the power configuration in the Nigerian society such that the vast majority of marginalized Nigerians are empowered to participate freely, actively and maximally in the political and economic life of the society.

The diversion of state funds for personal use means that the state is deprived of resources which should have been utilized for development. This results in the continuous widening of the income gap between the few corrupt ones and the generality of others who do not have access to such funds (Ojo et al, 2006). Widespread corruption impugns the development capabilities of the state, earning the state the inglorious deposition of a weak state, weak state structures and weak institutions. All these mean that enforcement mechanisms are undermined, where crimes and all forms of ills are perpetuated without adequate check or control. Weak state structures result in poor policy implementation, total policy failures, increasing poverty and corresponding resort to crime and general insecurity.

## Conclusion

Corruption in public procurement can take many forms including bribery, fraud or simply abuse of personal integrity. The incidence of corruption in procurement can be understood in different stages of contract awards. It is generally believed that the incidence of inducement to procurement officers tends to be high during the evaluation stage of a contracting process, when offers are studied in order to select the best contractor. Evidenced based researches have shown that procurement in the police and military in Nigeria is the most susceptible government's activity that corruption affects pervasively. This is true because governments all over the world are the biggest spenders of resources. Finally, public contracts affect all economic sectors and various types of agreements cascading from small procurements of goods and services to large capital expenditures for the present and future development of infrastructural projects.

## Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to guide policy formulation and implementation:

- i. Government should ensure that oversight institutions including National Assembly, audit panel, economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) do acknowledge and act upon citizen feedback especially on matters of procurement in the police and military in Nigeria.
- ii. Frequent procurement reviews and status reports/updates in the police and military in Nigeria are necessary to assess performance quarterly or biannually. Doing so will greatly enhance team work, timely resolution of conflicts and evaluation of critical objectives.

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